The scam factories in the Myawaddy region have a complex relationship with certain military forces in Myanmar. The Myawaddy telecom fraud park is strongly supported by the local warlord Myanmar 44th Division, which has a well-equipped and powerful heavy battalion.
The commander of the Myanmar 44th Division, Su Qi, is not controlled by the military and adheres to the principle of independence. He refuses to respond to conscription and is closely associated with telecom fraud crimes, allowing the Myawaddy telecom fraud park to expand under his protection, with criminal activities becoming increasingly rampant.
The Myanmar Border Guard Forces (such as the Karen Border Guard) also act as protectors of telecom fraud in the area. Although the Border Guard Forces are local armed groups that have joined the central Myanmar military and have been cooperating in combating local anti-government ethnic armed forces, they have ambiguous relationships with telecom fraud groups in the Myawaddy area.
The Myanmar military turns a blind eye to the "revenue-generating" actions of the Border Guard Forces in the area, thus condoning the existence and development of the Myawaddy scam factories.
However, with the launch of some military operations, ethnic armed groups such as the Karen National Union and the Military and Civilian Alliance have attacked the Myanmar military and Border Guard Forces positions related to telecom fraud, gradually breaking these relationships. This has dealt a certain blow to the Myawaddy scam forces and is changing the relationship pattern between the Myanmar military forces and the Myawaddy scam forces.
1. Description of Myanmar Military Factions
(I) Myanmar Government Army
The Myanmar Government Army is the main military force in Myanmar, with its highest decision-making body being the National Defense and Security Command Headquarters. The Ministry of Defense includes the General Staff Department, the First Special Operations Bureau, the Second Special Operations Bureau, and the Military Affairs Bureau. The Myanmar Government Army is divided into the Myanmar Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army has 10 military regions including the Yangon Military Region and the Northern Military Region, with a total force of 492,000 active personnel and 72,000 reservists. Its Special Operations Bureau has 6 special operations bureaus, similar to the concept of five major war zones in China, governing different strategic directions of operations, and also has 14 regional military commands. The Myanmar Navy is divided into three military regions: the Irrawaddy Navy Region, the Rakhine Navy Region, and the Tavoy Navy Region, with about 15,000 active personnel. The Myanmar Air Force is divided into 3 bases, 1 ground training base, and 1 maintenance base.
After the military coup on February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military government changed the management pattern of domestic military forces and their relationships with other forces.
(II) Ethnic Minority Local Armed Forces
1. Wa State Army
The Wa State Army is the largest armed force in northern Myanmar, bordering Cangyuan County, Gengma County, Lancang County, and Menglian County in Yunnan, China, covering an area of about 30,000 square kilometers. It has 5 division-level units, with more than 25,000 troops equipped with surface-to-air missiles, various mortars, recoilless guns, anti-aircraft machine guns, light and heavy machine guns, automatic rifles, semi-automatic rifles, light machine guns, and M-16 rifles. It also operates 4 military schools, heavily hiring retired military officers from the People's Liberation Army and Taiwan to train troops.
2. Shan State Armed Forces
The population of Shan State is over 3.6 million, accounting for 7% of Myanmar's total population. Among them, the Shan State Army (SSA) was a powerful ally of the Communist Party of Burma in the 1970s; the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) has been involved in intelligence gathering and drug smuggling with remnants of the Myanmar National Army since the 1960s; the Shan United Army (SUA) had a peak force of over 20,000 troops, equipped with SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, and other weapons.
3. Kachin Armed Forces
The Kachin, Myanmar's sixth largest ethnic group, has a population of 1.25 million and shares the same ethnicity with the Jingpo people in China. The Kachin Independence Army controls an area of 10,000 square kilometers with a population of 100,000, implementing a system of drafting one out of two or two out of three men, with 7,000 armed forces and 5,000 militia. It is second only to the Wa State Army in strength. It strives to smuggle weapons from India, Myanmar, and Thailand, such as M-16 rifles, M-24 submachine guns, M-79 rocket launchers, and bullets; there is also the New Kachin Democratic Army, originally formed in 1989 from part of the 101st Military Region of the Communist Party of Burma, with 1,500 regular troops and militia, equipped with Type 54 pistols, Type 56 automatic rifles, 75mm recoilless guns, 82mm mortars, and Maxim heavy machine guns.
4. Karen Ethnic Armed Forces
The Karen ethnic group has a population of over 4 million, distributed in Karen State and the Irrawaddy Delta region. The Karen Liberation Army has about 10,000 troops and occupies an important position in the Myanmar military system.
2. Assessment of Myanmar Military Level
(I) Military Size Dimension
The Myanmar Defense Forces have a total active force of 363,000, including 325,000 in the Army, 15,000 in the Navy, and 23,000 in the Air Force. The Army is large in size, but the proportion of modern equipment is relatively low, such as tanks being mostly old equipment or a small number of advanced tanks (such as VT-1 main battle tanks and T-72 main battle tanks), and there is no absolute advantage in military hardware size. Additionally, in terms of the Navy and Air Force, both the number of personnel and the level of equipment, such as ship tonnage and air power, are inferior to Thailand (Thailand's Navy has a total force of 66,000 and the Air Force has 43,000), indicating that Myanmar's military size overall does not reach the leading level in the region, but its scale should not be underestimated.
(II) Combat Capability Aspect
1. In terms of domestic suppression
When dealing with domestic ethnic minority local armed forces, the Myanmar military, despite its large numbers, has not been able to effectively suppress local armed forces militarily. Ethnic minority local armed forces have been developing locally for a long time, with complex terrain in the northern region (continuous mountains, dense forests) conducive to guerrilla warfare, allowing them to disperse forces or choose favorable terrain to confront the Myanmar military. Additionally, some local armed forces have their own sizable military forces and military equipment, having developed various military branches and advanced military technologies over many years, becoming strong opponents of the Myanmar military. For many years, the Myanmar military has been unable to completely eradicate local separatist forces, such as the Shan State Armed Forces and the Wa State Army, which have established stable control areas and military forces locally, reflecting the Myanmar military's difficulty in conducting domestic operations, especially in suppressing different internal forces, with combat capabilities limited by local conditions and opponents.
2. In terms of border defense
Myanmar needs to address potential border military risks with neighboring countries such as Thailand, but compared to Thailand's military advantages (such as having a light aircraft carrier, several large-tonnage ships, etc.), Myanmar's military equipment (whether naval ships or air force early warning aircraft) is relatively backward. Facing equipment-advantaged neighboring countries, its border military capabilities are relatively weak. However, Myanmar has certain shipbuilding capabilities, which is a potential development advantage for its navy.
3. In terms of internal stability
The Myanmar military faces a shortage of personnel, with a certain scale of total force but generally short-staffed in various combat units, leading to fatigue after long military operations. Additionally, there are defections within the military, but not severe. However, long-term military government rule and complex internal political situations bring uncertainty to the psychological state and loyalty of military personnel, affecting the internal stability of the Myanmar military. Especially with the existence of multiple internal military factions supporting different political camps, military factions may affect military command and overall military operation efficiency.
3. Analysis of Myanmar Military Equipment
(I) Army Equipment
1. Tank Equipment
The Myanmar Army is equipped with various tanks from different sources, such as about 160 Type 59D main battle tanks imported from China, equipped with a long-barreled 105mm rifled gun and enhanced defensive capabilities with reactive armor; about 130 Type 69II tanks, which are export-type tanks with certain firepower; and about 100 MBT-2000 Al-Khalid / VT-1A main battle tanks (jointly developed by China North Industries Corporation and Pakistan), equipped with 125mm smoothbore guns and other advanced internal equipment. Additionally, some tanks are imported from Ukraine, such as 139 T-72 tanks, and there are about 280 Type 59D/M and about 105 Type 63 tanks of different specifications, most of which are older models with limited modern rapid combat capabilities. This reflects the relative lag in the modernization process of updating and replacing old tanks, with significant differences in combat performance (such as protection, firepower accuracy, and mobility) between old tanks and new-generation tanks.
2. Anti-Tank Weapon Equipment
Equipped with over 1,000 M40 recoilless guns, this is a relatively lightweight weapon developed by the United States, which can be carried by individuals or vehicles, capable of firing various types of ammunition for anti-personnel and anti-armor tasks. Myanmar also has some locally produced recoilless guns, such as the MA-14 recoilless gun, modeled after the former Soviet Union's B-10 recoilless gun (equipment quantity unknown), and the MA-84 recoilless gun, modeled after Swedish products for various combat tasks (equipment quantity unknown). Additionally, there are locally produced RPG-7 type MA-10 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (equipment quantity unknown), a large number of single-soldier anti-tank weapons RPG-7, and about 1,000 Carl Gustaf 8.4 cm recoilless guns. The presence of these anti-tank weapons indicates that the Myanmar Army is equipped with a variety of types to counter armored threats, but mainly consists of locally produced or relatively outdated models, not very prominent in advanced guidance and performance aspects.
3. Rocket Launcher Equipment
Equipped with a large number of Type 63 107mm rocket launchers, this rocket launcher is suitable for Myanmar's terrain transportation (can be disassembled for human back transport when road traffic is poor, and assembled for combat), and its firepower is known as the infantry cannon, with high cost-effectiveness and suitable for attacking unarmored opponents. This reflects the Myanmar Army's emphasis on selecting lightweight, high-lethality firepower equipment suitable for local mountain and jungle warfare in its equipment configuration, but lacking the capability to develop or equip more advanced rocket launcher systems, with a relatively slow modernization process, and differences in range and accuracy compared to new rocket launchers.
(II) Naval Equipment
The Myanmar Navy has an active force of 15,000 personnel (including 800 marines), equipped with 2 Type 053H1 frigates, 3 Anawrahta-class light frigates, 1 Yungyi Ya-class frigate, 3 Kyan Sittha-class frigates, 1 amphibious dock landing ship, 1 Kilo-class submarine, and 1 Type 035B conventional submarine, with the rest being small patrol boats, missile boats, and other equipment. Compared to the Thai Navy, the Myanmar Navy lacks large surface ships, with generally small tonnage, indicating relative weakness in nearshore defense and maritime rights maintenance, and being at a disadvantage in facing naval competition from neighboring countries (such as Thailand).
(III) Air Force Equipment
The Myanmar Air Force's main equipment includes 26 MiG-29 fighter jets, 16 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, and other third-generation fighter jets. Additionally, there are 25 J-7 fighter jets, 21 Q-5C attack aircraft, 25 J-6 fighter jets, and other older models. There are over 150 helicopters, including more advanced 60 Mi-24/35 armed helicopters, 26 Mi-171 helicopters, and 27 transport aircraft, including 5 Y-8 transport aircraft, with the rest being small transport aircraft. Overall, the Myanmar Air Force has a small number of modern combat aircraft, with a large proportion of old models. For example, compared to the Thai Air Force, which has 53 F-16A/B fighter jets, 12 JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets, and other relatively advanced fighter models, and also has 2 Saab 340 Erieye airborne early warning aircraft (Myanmar has no early warning aircraft), this gives the Thai Air Force an advantage in regional combat capabilities, with the Myanmar Air Force currently lacking in combat range and capabilities (especially in air early warning, air superiority, and modern air combat capabilities).
4. Impact of Myawaddy Scam Factories on Myanmar Military
(I) Reputation Aspect
The Myawaddy scam factories involve a large number of scams targeting foreigners, with military forces such as the Myanmar 44th Division involved as protectors, which severely damages the international image of the Myanmar military, especially in diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and countries with extensive exchanges and cooperation such as China. Many international opinions link specific Myanmar military forces with these ugly scam industries, quickly labeling Myanmar with negative tags such as "military umbrella for a scam paradise." For example, in neighboring countries, due to the existence of scam factories and the interference of military support forces behind them, relations in the Myanmar-Thailand border area have become tense. Additionally, due to the international impact of a large number of scam victims, when facing diplomatic pressure from various parties (such as Chinese demands to combat scams), if the Myanmar military-related forces do not take active action, the reputation of the Myanmar military will be severely damaged on the international stage.
(II) Military Resource Allocation Aspect
With military forces involved in the Myawaddy telecom fraud interest chain, the already relatively scarce Myanmar military resource situation tends to worsen. Resources that should be invested in national defense construction (such as updating weapons and equipment, improving soldier training levels, military base facility construction, etc.) or quelling military turmoil in other regions are diverted to protecting the Myawaddy scam forces and consumed by the involved military forces. For example, military forces protecting the telecom fraud groups in the Myawaddy area need to invest more personnel and equipment to maintain the stability of this "gray industry." From a national perspective, these resources could be invested in regular military construction or other areas needed for social stability. When the military forces linked to telecom fraud are powerful (such as the large-scale Myanmar 44th Division), the situation of resource diversion and consumption is more severe, causing the resources for Myanmar's military development on the right track to be diverted, affecting overall development.
(III) Internal Military Structure Aspect
Due to the involvement of some Myanmar military forces in the Myawaddy scam factories independently of military control or having unhealthy collusion with the military (such as the Myanmar 44th Division not responding to military conscription, acting independently, and developing telecom fraud-related industries), this further splits and destabilizes the internal military structure of Myanmar. On one hand, there are independent military forces with their own troops involved in illegal profit industries, and on the other hand, the military government wants to control but is in an awkward situation (such as the Min Aung Hlaing administration being somewhat helpless against forces like the Myanmar 44th Division). This intensification of internal military splits and contradictions, when facing external threats or handling other domestic military crises, leads to difficulties in effectively unifying and coordinating Myanmar military forces, making cooperation against challenges difficult, and making the Myanmar military system prone to internal contradictions that can be exploited by external forces. For example, local armed groups may use internal military contradictions to seek opportunities to expand their territory or strategic interests, which could occur at any time.
